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Abstract
This paper undertakes an analysis of the Spanish local governments from the perspective of public 
choice theory . A set of hypotheses from a theoretical analysis is examined including alternative modes 
of public management, the possible use of financing instruments that generate fiscal illusion and the 
influence of certain pressure groups on the size of the municipal budget . We work with a sample of 140 
Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants for the period 2002-2010 . 
Our results support an (expansive) impact of the construction sector and the fiscal illusion hypothesis . 
Most controversially, our evaluation of the management modes seems to indicate that the indirect 
modes of public management adopted by local councils do represent attempts to escape from the rigid 
corsets that administrative legislation set out . 
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1. Introduction
The interrelations between politics and the economy has given rise to the fruitful field of 
Political Economy, one of the goals of which is to analyse the economic factors that influen-
ce the way people vote, as well as to determine the political factors and social organizations 
that influence the economic decisions taken by the public sector . The manifest concern of 
public opinion for economic affairs is made apparent each time a survey is reported by a 
specialist body . Such surveys show that voters, without losing sight of the importance of 
* We wish to thank Pilar Sorribas (University of Barcelona), participants at the XX Encuentro de Economía Pú-
blica (University of Sevilla, 2013) and the I Jornadas Iberoamerícanas de Financiación Local (Toledo, 2011) for 
insightful comments . The authors also acknowledge support from grant 2009SGR102 (Generalitat de Catalunya) 
and from projects ECO2012-37131 and MINECO-13-CSO2013-43359-R (Ministry of Economy and Competitive-
ness) . Usual disclaimers apply .
52 núria bosch roca and javier suárez pandiello
other areas of public affairs, are concerned primarily with the state of the economy when 
they declare their voting intentions . Thus, voters will express varying degrees of support for 
the prevailing level of fiscal pressure and the tax structure, for the measures adopted by the 
government to address unemployment and the financial crisis and for directives to review 
wage policies .
Political economy suggests that the expected outcomes of actions taken by public 
agents (politicians and bureaucrats) in the economic area are far from being exogenous and 
unlikely to depend exclusively on the taxpayers-voters will . It is perhaps easier to believe 
that these outcomes are more specifically determined by these agents maximising behaviour 
and their attempts at balancing private objectives that are not always compatible with their 
presence in the “political market” . For example, it can be claimed that politicians seek 
power and once they attain it simply want to hold onto it, while bureaucrats seek the best 
working conditions, prestige, high salaries and influence, etc . At the same time, voters se-
lect the combination of public and private services that maximises their level of utility . As 
such, there is no reason as to why these different objectives might be achieved by adopting 
the same measures . 
Moreover, asymmetry in the distribution of information between the various agents 
tends to cause imperfections in the “political market”, the main consequence of which is 
likely to be the exploitation of certain monopoly powers by those who enjoy a position of 
comparative advantage . 
This study undertakes an analysis of the Spanish local governments from the perspective 
of public choice . To do so we examine a set of hypotheses emanating from a theoretical 
analysis conducted with a sufficiently broad sample of medium-sized and large Spanish 
municipalities . 
The fact that this study is carried out in the local environment is of particular interest for 
three basic reasons . First, this is the nearest level of government to the citizens, who are 
therefore better able to keep a closer watch on politicians and acquire more accurate infor-
mation about their actions . As a result political responsibility, or accountability, is fostered . 
Indeed, one of the arguments forwarded by political economy in support of the decentraliza-
tion of government or political power (Lockwood, 2006) is the boost it represents to accoun-
tability, since the rent-seeking activities of politicians fall under stricter control . This increa-
se in citizen participation encourages a rendering of accounts and with it increased 
government efficiency . Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2005), for 
example, show how the degree of electoral control enjoyed by voters differs between situa-
tions of centralized and decentralized government, while Fissman and Gatti (2002) report 
that fiscal decentralization results in less corruption .
Second, a focus on the local environment allows us to examine the way in which rela-
tions with higher levels of government might influence the decision-making of local gover-
nment . And, third, the study of local governments is of interest simply because of their 
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number (well above that of government entities operating at other levels of the public admi-
nistration), a fact that is of particular advantage when conducting empirical analyses .
Specifically, the hypotheses we seek to test here take as their points of reference modes 
of public management, the possible use of financing instruments that generate fiscal illusion 
and the influence of certain pressure groups on the size of the municipal budget . We work 
with a sample of 140 Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants for the 
period 2002-2010 . 
The following section examines how these explanatory factors of expenditure –bureau-
cratic behaviour, institutional modes of management, interest groups and fiscal illusion– 
have been dealt with in the literature . The third section presents the empirical model and 
describes the sample and the variables used . In the fourth section the results are presented 
and the last section presents a set of conclusions .
2. Literature review 
2.1. Bureaucracy and institutional modes of management
Since Niskanen (1971), a trend of thought has been developed, which supposes that civil 
servants or bureaucrats are not neutral in the activities they undertake in the public sector, 
but rather that they act in accordance with their own interests, seeking to maximise a set of 
factors (salaries, prestige and power) that are positively related to the size of the budget . 
There have been numerous subsequent contributions on the behaviour of bureaucrats . So, we 
can hihghlight Migué and Bélanguer’s (1974) study, which concludes that bureaucratic be-
haviour gives rise not only to allocative inefficiency (as opposed to optimum production), but 
also to cost inflation . A more recent contribution, Bendor and Moe (1985), has shown bu-
reaucratic power from a new perspective, while a more extensive review of the theoretical 
literature is to be found in Rodríguez and Suárez-Pandiello (2003) .
Empirical evidence in relation to bureaucratic behaviour at the local level has been found 
in support of this bureaucratic hypothesis . For example, Spann (1977) attributes a good part 
of the relative losses in productivity suffered by sub-central American entities to such beha-
viour; Romer and Rosenthal (1982) find a bureaucratic explanation for increases in the 
educational material budget in Oregon’s school districts, and Chang and Turnbull (2002) 
show how the utility of the bureaucracy behaves as a growth function in employment in all 
the functions of government and local public expenditure .
In Spain, two empirical analyses of the bureaucratic hypothesis have been undertaken: 
Monasterio and Suárez-Pandiello (1989) and Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello (1993b) . In the 
first analysis, although the variable representing bureaucracy is not perfect 1, it is significant 
and it does provide explicit support for the bureaucratic hypothesis . Bosch and Suárez-Pan-
diello (1993b) test the decentralization hypothesis propounded by Brennan and Buchanan 
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(1980) according to which decentralization provides incentives for competition and limits 
the expansion of the public sector, by testing a hypothesis “a contrario sensu” . They show 
that the multiplication of bureaucratic structures associated with decentralization can increa-
se the size of the public sector rather than reduce it . Their findings are in line with the bu-
reaucratic hypothesis and as such contradict Brennan and Buchanan’s decentralization 
hypothesis . 
A further field that has attracted research attention is that of the modes of management 
of public services, that is, modes of direct and indirect management . The former can be 
conducted through the municipal entity itself or through autonomous organizations and local 
public companies that depend on it . The latter, on the other hand, involves the establishment 
of a management contract (the best-known form of which is the concession), whereby the 
municipality entrusts the provision of a public service to a private person or concessionaire 
for a certain period of time and they, in return, receive the payment of a tariff from the users 
of the service . It is expected that bureaucratic behaviour will have a greater influence on the 
results in the direct mode . A fuller explanation of both modes can be found in García Valiñas 
and Suárez-Pandiello (2006) .
Many studies have examined whether the externalization of the management of public 
services is efficient . For example, Domberger and Jensen (1997) found that when contracting 
out competition was introduced into the public sector, savings were made in the provision of 
public services . More recently Ohlsson (2003) has shown that the costs of the public produc-
tion of refuse collection in a sample of Swedish municipalities were 6% lower than under 
private production . Brudney et al. (2005), who analysed the externalization of public servi-
ces in the American states through state agencies, found that in 50% of cases externalization 
improved the quality of the service but barely one-third of the agencies reported cost reduc-
tions .
In Spain, Bosch et al. (2000) found no evidence to indicate that the private production 
of local refuse collection (externalization by concession) is more efficient than public pro-
duction . However, the data used has certain limitations, failing to provide information about 
the mode of public management (whether it is delivered via the municipality itself, indepen-
dent organizations, or public companies) and about the administrative conditions of the 
concession . A further study of the Spanish case is provided by Bel and Miralles (2003) in 
which the authors analyse whether the externalization of the refuse collection service is un-
dertaken for ideological reasons . Their results, however, show that the decision is more 
usually taken for pragmatic reasons .
It is not always the case that decentralized modes of management are adopted to improve 
efficiency . There are occasions on which this objective is not easily separated from others 
that are intrinsically political, due to the particular goals of politicians and bureaucrats . This 
is the case of the recent proliferation of autonomous organizations, foundations and public 
and/or mixed companies created by many public administrations in Spain in response to the 
directive on budgetary stability restricting their borrowing capacity . This phenomenon has 
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been analysed with respect to Spain’s regional governments by Fernández Llera and García 
Valiñas (2013) and their results support the existence of this type of behaviour . The studies 
of Fernández Llera (2005) and Cuadrado and Carrillo (2008) reach similar conclusions . 
Anyway, the public private partnership approach is controversial and it is possible to iden-
tify several problems with it (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001) . 
2.2. Interest groups
Olson’s (1965) pioneering study of interest groups and their influence on public bud-
gets has generated many theoretical and applied studies . Mitchell and Munger (1991), for 
example, conducted a review of the literature examining how interest groups influence po-
litics in democracies and how government institutions should be designed to control these 
groups 2 .
In Spain, Bosch et al. (2000) have examined whether the degree of commercial acti-
vity in Spanish municipalities (which determines the strength of retail associations) has 
any influence on the efficiency with which public services are provided . A positive relation 
was found between efficiency and commercial activity, pointing to greater control being 
exercised by retailers over local government, thus fostering efficiency . As such, the 
hypothesis that the activity of interest groups results in less efficient behaviour was not 
verified . However, a negative relation was found between the level of tourist activity and 
efficiency in the provision of local public services, reflecting the fact that entrepreneurs in 
this sector are likely to undertake rent-seeking activities or that tourism generates seasonal 
congestion costs .
2.3. Fiscal illusion
Collective choice theory holds that individuals can make an efficient fiscal choice, co-
rrectly evaluating their various alternatives, insofar as they can attribute the real cost to the 
price/tax they have to pay . Hence, they can identify a direct relation between their tax pay-
ments and the benefits they can expect to obtain from public expenditure . However, this re-
lation becomes increasingly indirect as the tax structure affects the way in which the alter-
natives are perceived . Thus, an individual’s perception can be distorted by their fiscal 
illusion, causing them to falsely identify the alternatives available to them . In other words, 
fiscal illusion arises as a consequence of the way in which the individual perceives the costs 
or the benefits of the various alternatives, which are falsely identified, generally underesti-
mating public service costs .
At the turn of the last century, Puviani (1903) made a fundamental contribution develo-
ping his theory of fiscal illusion . Yet, it was not until the 1960s that Buchanan (1967) pro-
moted further studies in this area . Both authors mention that certain types of fiscal illusion 
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can be produced depending on the structure and nature of the fiscal institutions . The fiscal 
illusion thus generated can be grouped into two basic categories: the illusion that arises from 
connecting tax obligations to events that the taxpayer considers favourable and that which 
arises from hiding the charging of taxes . For example, the first category would include taxes 
on inheritances or donations or taxes related to gambling . Indirect taxes, such as a general 
consumption tax, would be included in the second category . These are camouflaged in the 
price of goods, which means the taxpayer is quite unaware of the quantity of tax paid and 
even, in many cases, of its very existence . This concealment of tax payments causes people 
to underestimate the cost of public services .
Other types of public financing that can give rise to fiscal illusion include intergovern-
mental transfers and borrowing . In these instances, the fiscal illusion is created because in-
dividuals do not perceive clearly how they participate in the financing of public services .
More recent studies in this field include Mourao (2008), who compiled a fiscal illusion 
index for 68 countries between 1960 and 2006 . At the local level, Islam (1998) provides 
some evidence that the subsidies received by the local governments create fiscal illusion . On 
the other hand, Worthington and Dollery (1999) do not find support to the existence of the 
fly-paper effect resulting from subsidies to Australian municipalities, while Campbell (2004) 
studied the phenomenon of fiscal illusion and Leviathan behaviour in overlapping local ju-
risdictions, supporting the hypothesis of fiscal illusion 3 . 
Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello (1993a, 1994, 1995) and Bosch et al. (2012) examine the 
phenomenon of fiscal illusion in relation to local government financing in Spain . In a sample 
of Spanish municipalities they present empirical evidence of the fact that local taxes that are 
hard to perceive together with subsidies cause fiscal illusion . Similarly, García-Alegre and 
López-Casasnovas (2006) analyse how, among a group of Catalan municipalities, fiscal illu-
sion can arise by a confusing accounting system .
3. Empirical analysis
In this empirical analysis we want to test whether the expenditure of Spanish local go-
vernments is affected by the three factors summarized in the previous section: 1) public 
service management modes (i .e ., direct modes, by employing their own civil servants or 
municipal employees, or indirect modes, by creating ad hoc organizations or resorting to 
externalization); 2) the pressure brought to bear by certain interest groups in the planning of 
the municipal budget and 3) the structure of their financing (the degree of perceptibility of 
their revenues in the eyes of the population)
The equation to be estimated is the following one:
Eit = α1 + α2RTit-1 + α3RCit-1 + α4 FCit-1 + α5 Exit-1 + α6 CGit-1 + vi +uit
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where
E is the total non-financial expenditure per capita in municipality i at year t; 
RT are the revenues obtained by the municipality from taxes that are clearly perceived 
by the taxpayers; 
RC represents an approximation of the impact of the construction sector on the local 
budget; 
FC is an index that reflects the weight of financial charges for interest and amortization 
of the principal on the municipality’s current account income; 
Ex is a variable that approximates the level of externalization of public services supplied 
by the local council; 
CG are the per capita current grants received by the municipality . The sub-index i and t 
represent the identification of the municipality and the year of the data, respectively .
αi are the parameters to be estimated; and 
vi + uit is the value of the residuals . Specifically, vi only captures variations between units 
(differences between units, but its value is constant for each) . In itself uit = vt + eit is the re-
sidual with the usual econometric properties (zero mean, uncorrelated with the independent 
variables and with v and homoscedastic), which in turn comprises two components – the 
variation in time (vt) and the standard residual .
The equation is estimated by ordinary least squares and fixed effects (appropriate data 
panel specification according to the Hausman test) . As Veiga and Veiga (2007), all the expla-
natory variables are included with one lag in order to avoid their potential endogeneity . Given 
the persistence of the public expenditure pattern, a lag of the expenditure is included as an 
explanatory variable . This lag would be correlated with the error term, making OLS estimator 
biased . To overcome this problem the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed 
by Arellano and Bond is used . All the specifications include time dummies .
3.1. Variables
Up to this juncture we have been unable to obtain detailed information for certain varia-
bles that must be deemed important . Consequently, we have had to accept the use of approxi-
mations that are fairly rough and ready for our purposes and for this reason our results must 
be treated with a certain degree of caution .
Specifically, the Ex variable, constructed to test the effects of the different management 
modes, is defined as the relation between expenditure on employees (Chapter 1 in the expen-
diture budget) and expenditure on materials, supplies and others (Chapter 2, paragraph 22 in 
the expenditure budget, which includes the outsourced services by the local government) for 
each municipality and year . As the value of this variable increases, we expect to find a greater 
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proportion of local expenditure being managed directly by the municipality itself . In contrast, 
a low value should be indicative of a more intensive externalization of the services that are the 
competence of the municipality . Moreover, we would have liked to test the bureaucratic 
hypothesis (using, for example, the number of workers providing a service for the municipa-
lities) and the modes of management separately (using as a variable, for example, the propor-
tion of the municipal budget that is managed indirectly, or even the number of decentralized 
bodies involved in the management) . We do not rule out performing such an exercise in the 
future but to date a lack of data prevents us from doing so . As for the expected sign, there are 
two alternatives: a positive sign would indicate that in municipalities in which direct manage-
ment predominates, total expenditure is greater and, consequently, it can be deduced that those 
who have externalized their management have done so in pursuit of efficiency via cost-sa-
vings; alternatively, a negative sign would support the hypothesis propounded by Fernández 
Llera and García Valiñas, whereby the externalization of management can be seen as an ins-
trument for avoiding the restrictions imposed by the budgetary stability directive .
The variable RV has been approximated using the proportion of the ordinary income of each 
municipality and for each year that the cash tax revenue from the recurring taxes most directly 
perceptible by citizens represents (namely, the property tax, vehicle tax, and water, refuse co-
llection and sewage disposal rates) . We have therefore omitted those taxes most susceptible to 
being transferred, a priori, to persons other than to the taxpayer (as is the case of the tax on 
economic activities) and those taxes that are not homogeneously distributed over time because 
of their sporadic (for the taxpayers) nature, even when they are collected every year by the mu-
nicipalities (such as optional taxes on construction and building work and taxes on the increase 
in the value of urban building land) . Certainly, this variable is not a perfect proxy because the 
tax collection includes two components (tax capacity and tax effort) and only the second is under 
direct control of local authorities . However we think that this little bias may be assumed for our 
purposes . A negative sign for the coefficient of this variable would confirm the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis in the sense that it would mean, conversely, more expenditure in those municipalities 
in which there is a more intense use of financial instruments that are less perceptible to citizens, 
such as intergovernmental transfers or taxes that are easy to hide .
To test the effects of interest groups, we selected at the outset what we considered to be 
two, a priori, relevant sectors: first, construction, which is highly dependent on regulation by 
local governments; and, second, hotels and restaurants, also closely tied to a specific area 4 . 
Here again, however, a paucity of information has forced us to be modest in our assessments . 
Our main objective in selecting variables was to use those that could capture the relative 
weight of both sectors (separately) in the economic activity of each area . However, because 
of the absence of reliable data on municipal production and income, and more specifically 
on decentralization by branch of activity (this being exacerbated by the new regulations on 
the tax on economic activities, which removed fiscal control from many activities), we were 
once more forced to use a rather imperfect proxy variable . Thus, in this initial approach, we 
opted not to study the hotel and restaurant sector, while to evaluate the construction sector 
we elaborated an ad hoc variable based on fiscal data . The variable RC is defined as revenue 
collected per inhabitant in each municipality of a set of taxes directly associated with activi-
ty in construction and public works . These taxes are the tax on construction, installation and 
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public works and the tax on the increase in the value of urban land, as well as rates and public 
charges for public works licences, charges for urbanization and the use of urban areas and 
special contributions . A positive sign for the corresponding coefficient would confirm the 
importance of this economic sector for the municipal budget .
Furthermore, we included an additional variable to test, at least tentatively, the degree of 
“responsibility” characterising the political conduct of those in local government . Thus, we 
included the variable FC, which measures the portion of current account revenue that is as-
signed to servicing incurred debt (interest and amortization of the principal) . A negative 
coefficient would imply that the government was restricting expenditure because of increases 
in debt charges, which would support the hypothesis of responsible behaviour .
Finally CG are included as control variables given their important weight in the munici-
palitites’ revenues, as well as time effects . 
Table 1
SUMMARIZES THE ABOVE INFORMATION ABOUT HYPOTHESIS, VARIABLES 
APPROACHING THEM AND EXPECTED SIGNS
HYPOTHESIS VARIABLE PROXY EXPECTED SIGN
Fiscal Illusion RT
(Revenues from property tax + vehicle 
tax + water, refuse collection and sewage 
disposal rates)/Current revenue 
-
Interest Groups RC
Revenue collected from a set of taxes 
directly associated with activity in con-
struction and public works per capita
+
Financial Responsibility FC
Portion of current account revenue that is 
assigned to servicing incurred debt
-
Modes of Management Ex
Relation between expenditure on em-
ployees and expenditure on materials, 
supplies and others 
?
3.2. Sample
To estimate our model we initially drew on a sample comprising a panel of 140 Spanish 
municipalities (all of those with a population of over 50,000 inhabitants in 2010) for the 
period 2002 to 2010 . 
60 núria bosch roca and javier suárez pandiello
Table 2
REPORTS OUR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 2002 AND 2010 
(THE FIRST AND LAST YEARS IN THE SAMPLE)
Maximum Minimum
2002 2010 % Δ 2002 2010 % Δ
Pop 3,016,788 3,273,049 8 .49% 21,488 51,177 138 .17%
E 2,166 .61 2,871 .77 32 .55% 451 .51 519 .84 15 .13%
Ex 0 .736 0 .542 -26 .36% 0 .025 0 .030 20 .00%
RT 411 .14 225 .72 -45 .10% 4 .10 0 .70 -82 .93%
RC 82 .270 43 .013 -47 .72% 0 .026 0 .583 2,142 .31%
FC 3 .249 11 .079 241 .00% 0 .212 0 .523 146 .70%
CG 552 .83 1,352 .57 144 .66% 149 .36 146 .35 -2 .02%
Average Median
2002 2010 % Δ 2002 2010 % Δ
Pop 154,750 170,745 10 .34% 79,691 88,284 10 .78%
E 780 .25 888 .19 13 .83% 711 .03 829 .41 16 .65%
Ex 0 .395 0 .309 -21 .77% 0 .395 0 .303 -23 .29%
RT 81 .73 32 .22 -60 .58% 63 .48 23 .16 -63 .52%
RC 12 .394 8 .649 -30 .22% 11 .335 8 .107 -28 .48%
FC 1 .388 2 .401 72 .98% 1 .297 1 .795 38 .40%
CG 222 .30 284 .83 28 .13% 193 .84 237 .24 22 .39%
Standard deviation Coefficient of variation
2002 2010 % Δ 2002 2010 % Δ
Pop 292,593 313,454 7 .13% 1 .891 1 .836 -2 .91%
E 281 .25 306 .44 8 .96% 0 .360 0 .345 -4 .17%
Ex 0 .104 0 .091 -12 .50% 0 .263 0 .296 12 .55%
RT 62 .74 31 .78 -49 .35% 0 .77 0 .98 27 .27%
RC 8 .184 5 .002 -38 .88% 0 .660 0 .578 -12 .42%
FC 0 .497 1 .647 231 .39% 0 .358 0 .686 91 .62%
CG 78 .54 143 .47 82 .67% 0 .35 0 .52 48 .57%
If we inspect the columns illustrating the temporal development of the figures, the first 
thing we notice is that the population is highly dispersed, even though, it is limited (as is the 
sample) to the most highly populated municipalities . In fact, according to 2010 figures, only 
two municipalities had populations greater than one million inhabitants (Madrid and Barce-
lona) and only four had more than 500,000, while 83 had fewer than 100,000 .
The variable representing the institutional structure, Ex, also shows this to be highly 
dispersed, with a trend, moreover, that is negative . This points to overall advances in the 
process of externalizing services .
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As for the remaining variables, we can note the high variability of the variables RT and 
RC. FC seems more volatile . This can be explained by the fact that from 2008 on the effects 
of the economic crisis had already begun to appear, having an especially significant impact 
on the construction sector, reflected in the evolution of financial charges, which show a 
negative trend .
4. Results
Table 3 show the results of the analysis conducted for three alternative estimations: or-
dinary least squares, fixed effects (appropriate data panel specification according to the 
Hausman test) and Arellano-Bond GMM, run in order to avoid possible problems of endo-
geneity . In all cases we used the total non-financial expenditure per capita as a dependent 
variable and the continuous variables were used in logarithmic form and the explanatory 
variables have been lagged a year .
All the specifications gave results aligned with the hypothesis to be tested, and so we 
believe we have found interesting results which in any case should be supported by further 
research . 
A more specific inspection shows that the negative signs of the coefficients of the varia-
ble representing the management modes (Ex) seem to serve as proof (or at least an indica-
tion) that the indirect modes of public management adopted by local councils have generated 
an increase in costs (i .e ., the municipalities in which expenditure on employees predominates 
over the externalization of services spend relatively less) . Thus, our data results allow us to 
conclude that these modes are being used to escape administrative control and strict budget 
restrictions along the lines forwarded by Fernández Llera and García Valiñas (2013) or that 
they include a certain multiplication of parallel bureaucratic structure factors as Bosch and 
Suárez Pandiello (1993b) suggested in reference to another area .
Nevertheless, we cannot say anything conclusive about the analysis of the variable FC . 
The negative coefficient sign provided by estimations could mean a certain degree of support 
for the evidence that Spanish municipalities have behaved responsibly insofar as when the 
weight of financial charges for incurred debt rises a contraction of expenditure seems to 
become apparent in order to avoid a certain snowballing effect . However the t values for the 
coefficients are not big enough to consider that effect statistically significant . 
The fiscal illusion hypothesis is upheld by all the specifications proposed, given the 
negative and statistically significant sign presented by the relevant variable, RT . As the 
budgetary weight of those taxes that are clearly perceived by the citizens rises, per capita 
expenditure falls . 
Finally, the positive and highly significant sign of the variable RC is indicative of the 
marked impact of the construction sector on municipal budgets, although this claim needs to 
be tempered given the nature of the proxy variable employed .
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Table 3
RESULTS
Dep Var: LogEt
(1)
OLS
(2)
Fixed effects
(3)
GMM
A-B with L=2
N = 1126 N=1126 N=1122
logRTt-1 -0 .144*** -0 .0699*** -0 .540**
(-4 .82) (-3 .40) (-3 .07)
logRCt-1 0 .176*** 0 .0545*** 0 .448***
(8 .78) (3 .55) (3 .36)
logFCt-1 -0 .0127 -0 .0178 -0 .0707
(-0 .61) (-1 .55) (-1 .78)
logEXt-1 -0 .0883** -0 .148*** -0 .214***
(-2 .68) (-5 .92) (-5 .71)
logCGt-1 0 .214*** 0 .0380 0 .119*
(3 .73) (0 .96) (2 .14)
logEt-1 0 .00315
(0 .02)
Cons 4 .814*** 6 .371*** 4 .104***
(14 .45) (27 .19) (5 .97)
R2 0 .3835 0 .2581
F 58 .57*** 50 .56***
σv 0 .1980
σu 0 .1378
ρ 0 .6738
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences:
z = -5 .24
Pr > z = 0 .000
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences:
z = 1 .42
Pr > z = 0 .156
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions:
chi2(6) = 25 .45 Prob 
> chi2 = 0 .000
t statistics in parentheses * p<0 .05, ** p<0 .01, *** p<0 .001
5. Summary and Conclusions
The essential goal of this paper is to explore the possible relations that exist between 
economic and political factors in Spain’s institutions of local government . Specifically, in 
this paper we have explained the behaviour of medium-sized and large Spanish municipali-
ties in relation to modes of public management (directly, through their own civil servants or 
municipal employees, or indirectly, through the creation of ad hoc organizations or through 
externalization), the possible use of financing tools that generate fiscal illusion and the in-
63Politics and Finance in Spanish municipalities
fluence of certain interest groups on the size of municipal budgets, between 2002 and 2010, 
a period that combines both, years of affluence and some final years when the current crisis 
had already appeared with all its ferocity at the local level .
Unfortunately, owing to problems of data availability, we have not had access to all the 
statistical information necessary to evaluate our hypotheses more conclusively, especially 
with regard to the management modes and the impact of interest groups on municipal bud-
gets . This inevitably means that our results should be viewed with a degree of caution, 
although most are in line with previous findings in the literature . 
The (expansive) impact of the construction sector is a robust result of the estimations 
carried out here . However inconclusive outcomes can be found about the attitude taken by 
municipal governments when they see a rise in the servicing of the debt they have incurred . 
The negative sign of the representative variable could point towards the “responsible” beha-
viour of local leaders, but the parameter is not statistically significant . As for the fiscal illu-
sion hypothesis, the significance of the negative coefficients in all the estimations carried out 
seems to support its effects . 
Finally, and most controversially, our evaluation of the management modes seems to 
indicate that the indirect modes of public management adopted by local councils do repre-
sent attempts to escape from the rigid corsets that administrative legislation and, in particu-
lar, the directive on budgetary stability have placed upon the managers of local affairs, as is 
often suggested . Our results suggest that externalization did not serve to reduce costs, or 
conversely that local councils that have done at least by way of adopting methods to decen-
tralize expenditure spend relatively more per capita . However, we are aware that the model’s 
implicit assumptions are great in this respect, and so further study is indispensable before 
these results can be considered conclusive .
Notes
1 . The	variable	used	is	(Expenditure	on	employees/total	expenditure)	•	(N.º of	councillors).
2 . It should also be mentioned for their contributions Winden (1999), Epstein and Mealem (2009) and Horgos 
and Zimmermann (2009) . At the local level, see Browne (1978), Menzel (1990), and Cooper et al. (2005) .
3 . Other studies to be mentioned are Wagner (2001) and Cohen and Percoco (2004) .
4 . We can’t test the second group because the lack of available information .
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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la conducta de los gobiernos locales españoles desde la perspectiva de la teoría 
de la elección pública . Se examinaron un conjunto de hipótesis a partir de un análisis teórico que 
incluye modos alternativos de gestión pública, la posible utilización de instrumentos financieros que 
generen ilusión fiscal y la influencia de ciertos grupos de presión en el tamaño del presupuesto mu-
nicipal . Trabajamos con una muestra de 140 municipios españoles con más de 50 .000 habitantes para 
el período 2002-2010 .
Nuestros resultados apoyan la presencia de un impacto (expansivo) del sector de la construcción y la 
hipótesis de ilusión fiscal . Lo más polémico puede ser que nuestra evaluación de los modos de gestión 
parece indicar que los modos indirectos de gestión pública adoptados por algunos gobiernos locales 
pudieran estar representando intentos de escapar de los corsés rígidos que establece la legislación ad-
ministrativa .
Palabras clave: Política, Elección Pública, Gestión de los Gobiernos Locales, Municipios, Finan-
ciación Local .
Códigos JEL: H7, H11, H83 .
